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Abstract 
We simulate the process of possible interactions between a set of competitive services and a 
set of portals that provide online rating for these services. We argue that to have a profitable 
business, these portals are forced to have subscribed services that are rated by the portals. To 
satisfy the subscribing services, we make the assumption that the portals improve the rating of 
a given service by one unit per transaction that involves payment. In this study we follow the 
'what-if' methodology, analysing strategies that a service may choose from to select the best 
portal for it to subscribe to, and strategies for a portal to accept the subscription such that its 
reputation loss, in terms of the integrity of its ratings, is minimised. We observe that the 
behaviour of the simulated agents in accordance to our model is quite natural from the real-
would perspective. One conclusion from the simulations is that under reasonable conditions, if 
most of the services and rating portals in a given industry do not accept a subscription policy 
similar to the one indicated above, they will lose, respectively, their ratings and reputations, 
and, moreover the rating portals will have problems in making a profit. Our prediction is that 
the modern portal-rating based economy sector will eventually evolve into a subscription 
process similar to the one we suggest in this study, as an alternative to a business model based 
purely on advertising. 
Keywords:  
Simulation of Competition, Subscribing to Rating, Web Portals  
 Introduction  
1.1  Portals providing online rating of services, such as financial services, are becoming more 
popular nowadays. A rating portal providing comparisons between competitive services, has 
the potential of becoming a well established web enterprise. For some services the comparison 
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is performed based on a set of measurable values such as performance and price, for example 
when the service involves computer hardware. In such an environment, services can make a 
rational decision whether they wish to advertise on the portal, based on the set of measurable 
values. However, for some services like banking, brokerage and other financial services, 
characterised by such parameters as customer support quality, it is impossible to establish an 
objective set of measurable values. In these cases the rating portals publish their scores for the 
competing businesses based on their own private estimation strategy. We believe that 
evolution of the interactions between the agents being rated and rating agents is an important 
social process which is worth examining through simulation. 
1.2  There are two common ways to rate services: (1) assigning to each service a score in a range 
of values, or (2) ranking the services in order of preference. In this study we simulate the 
plausible interaction between portals and services using a simplified model, and we analyse 
possible scenarios of how services can influence the portals' rating system. Our approach is 
based on a straightforward revenue model for rating portals, where they require the rated 
services to be paying subscribers in order to obtain a rating. Within this model we follow the 
dynamics of how the competing services may influence the portals to improve their respective 
ratings. 
1.3  Web-based rating portals are normally assumed to be independent, and they do their upmost to 
impress on the customers of the services being rated that this is indeed the case. However, the 
current web economy does not broadly support the revenue model, where rating portals charge 
their customers, so instead, the companies competing for ratings fund the portals through 
advertising their products on the portal's website. This model of advertising can be tied in to 
the rating mechanism, leading to a new form of advertising. In some sense this is similar to the 
paid placement model of advertising on search engines, where the (sponsored) ranking for a 
given query is decided by a bidding process for keywords that will be submitted as queries by 
users to the search engine (Feng et al 2004). 
1.4  Over last couple of years, the role of paid placement advertising on web portals has 
dramatically increased. Within the search engine community such adverts are known as 
sponsored links, and they are normally charged on a pay-per-click basis. It is natural to expect 
that the order of paid placement advertising is perceived by users as a form of rating, although, 
in reality, the rank of a sponsored link for a given search query is determined via a bidding 
process. It is therefore, possible to explore alternative mechanisms of providing and evolving 
ratings for sponsored adverts. These mechanisms will be competitive in nature; the 
competition involves both the services to be advertised and the web portals displaying the 
adverts 
1.5  Here we obtained our dataset of initial (pure) ratings from a selection of search engines' rating 
of a number of services. (Note that we did not record the ratings of sponsored links.) This 
provides us with a 'good' starting point for the simulations we carried out. However, prior to 
being able to speculate about a future possible business model for rating portals, these portals 
would have to disclose their advertising/rating policy. 
Introducing "Rating subscription"  
1.6  In this study we suggest a plausible model of advertising based on a process of transferring 
resources from services to rating portals in the form of a rating subscription. In this model 
services enter into a contract, where they are paying rating portals for a small increase of their 
rating on the portal's list. Portals attempt to carry out this small increase, while not deviating 
significantly from pure  rating, which these portals would otherwise assign. In the situation 
where the subscription rate is the same for all participating services, the rating results would 
not significantly deviate from pure ones, which are not sponsored by any of the services. 
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Therefore, we can argue that, in this case, the reputation of the rating portals would not be 
strongly affected by services who are sponsoring their rating lists. The drawback of this 
scheme is that the services, which decide not to join into a subscription agreement, will either 
be forced to withdraw from the rating scheme or to suffer overall low ratings by a community 
of portals. We will refer to the rating modified in the course of subscription process as to the 
forced rating. 
1.7  The methodology of this study is as follows. We analyze the current business model of web 
portals that provide rating services and hypothesise that they would be willing to be funded by 
the services rather than by their users (i.e. customers). We then conduct the what-if study 
suggesting a simple model with rational agents for services and portals as possible for a 
simulation of the subscription model. The resultant behaviour is verified and analysed with 
respect to the possibility of extracting patterns of rating subscription-based behaviour from 
real publicly available data. We conclude the paper with a discussion of how the predicted 
subscription process fits into the current advertising models; also the process itself is 
considered from the standpoint of conflict resolution in multi-agent systems (Lerman and 
Shehory 2000, Klusch and Gerber 2002, Galitsky 2005). 
1.8  In the literature on decision-making, the what-if methodology uses informal patterns of 
counterfactual reasoning to analyse the conjecture of an assumption that can be disputed 
(Thierauf 1982; Turban 1990). In our case the assumption is that rating portals are ready to 
accept subscriptions from the services being rated, because we envisage no alternative income 
mechanisms for these portals. The next step is to build the most simple and plausible model of 
such a subscription procedure using initial conditions taken from the real-world. The 
behaviour of involved agent (portals and services) is then analyzed with respect to rationality, 
consistency, plausibility and match with available economic data from a similar domain 
(compare with Zacharia et al 1999).  
Economic model  
2.1  Portals are primarily characterised by their reputation. To express this quantitatively, we refer 
to the difference between the average rating of each service and the individual rating of each 
service on each portal. The higher the portal's reputation, the more potential customers it has 
and a higher the number of web surfers who would follow the portal's recommendation to 
select a particular (top-rated) service. Also, the higher the portal's reputation is, the higher is 
its appeal for the services to be rated by this portal, and, therefore, the potential revenue stream 
for the portal is higher. At the same time, when a portal accepts resources from the services it 
rates, its reputation may drop because its forced rating may become less pure. The dynamics of 
such a process is the subject of the current study. 
2.2  How should the reputation of a portal be defined? Here we suggest a simple model where there 
is no quantitative measure for objective rating: each portal, while having its own rating system, 
aims to maximise its revenues on the one hand, and on the other hand aims to deviate as little 
as possible from the average portal rating. The justification for this is that often the public 
perceives the average (or typical) rating (or opinion) as the most trustworthy (Myung and Pitt 
2003). This is in contrast to a distinctive or radical opinion, which may be too risky to follow. 
2.3  Evidently, services' ratings by portals is public information. Therefore, portal reputation may 
be calculated by an external observer in a similar way to the one we suggest herein. What is 
not explicitly made clear for an end user is the subscription policy, however, an external 
observer can speculate about it and capture its features. A portal accepts an offer from the 
service which has a highest rank by the rest of portals, selecting among all services which 
offer a subscription payment. 
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2.4  We selected our model using the average rating as being the most plausible, based on 
psychological studies of how the public perceive the parameters of relating to the subject of 
interest (see e.g. Myung and Pitt 2003). We also conducted a limited study of how financial 
services (mutual funds) are ranked according to search engine keyword-based queries and 
compared this data with the most popular rating of mutual funds according to 
morningstar.com. We observed that averaging is the simplest way to perceive the rating data, 
and that the most popular search engine (google.com) is quite close (however, not the closest) 
to the rating, averaged over the four search engines (see the selected rating dataset in the 
"Formal Model" section below). 
Selecting a partially rational strategy  
2.5  Our model reproduces the real-life conflict between the services and portals: each service is 
determined to improve its ratings irrespectively of how it affects a portal's reputation, and vice 
versa, each portal wishes to achieve higher reputation and at the same time to increases its 
revenues. No evident compromise is possible. 
2.6  Rather than attempting to build an optimal strategy for services and portals, we suggest a 
simple partially rational strategy, where the agents only take into account a limited set of 
(two) parameters: 
? Services request a higher ranking from portals with higher reputation.  
? Portals select services, which request a change in rating, that would minimise the 
damage to their reputation.  
One way of verifying this approach is by changing the partially rational strategy into a random 
one, and showing that the performance in terms of revenue and rating/reputation significantly 
decreases (Section 4). 
2.7  This strategy is called partially rational because all involved agents implement a limited 
strategy and are not capable of applying introspection. Services do not take the strategies 
played by all other services into account. More specifically, if services were fully rational in 
the usual (economic) sense, one would expect them to anticipate (or try to anticipate) the 
behaviour of other services and then to incorporate the effect of other services' strategies into 
their own strategy. For instance, one service could anticipate that it is competing with another 
service, which has a higher chance of being accepted than itself. In that case, a refined strategy 
would be to choose another portal which may not exhibit the best "reputation/ranking" 
compromise, but with whom the service has a higher chance of being accepted. While more 
difficult to implement, such strategy may be more 'rational' than the suggested strategy. 
2.8  To provide realistic initial conditions for our simulation, we have chosen fifteen mutual funds 
as services and four well-known keyword search portals, which provide ratings for these 
services by ordering them within search results page. We believe such a setting is most closely 
related to our model. In terms of the initial conditions, this is because the ratings of respective 
websites are objectively ranked, or otherwise ranked as with paid advertisement. The ranking 
order changes in time due to modifications in the rating algorithms effected by keyword search 
portals, on one hand, and website infrastructure development for the services, on the other 
hand. Therefore, the evolution of services' rating by keyword search portals are partially 
caused by changes in advertisement efforts of services (by means of websites). In our model, 
we will simulate the efforts of website improvement as a subscription process having a direct 
influence on rating portals. We suggest the reader to consult (Tennenholtz 1999) for social 
issues regarding agents' rationality. 
2.9  We have chosen a relatively small number of agents so that we can track their behaviour and 
observe the results. We have also verified the model with a larger set of participating agents 
and although the convergence time is longer, we recorded similar phenomenology as revealed 
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by the smaller data set. 
2.10  We have simulated all phases of the subscription process, including the initial phase, when the 
services initiate the subscription process to modify their initial (pure) rating, and the terminal 
phase, when the services run out of resources, and stop being selected by portals, or see no 
further benefit in participating in the process. We believe that simulating the full cycle of the 
subscription process rather than just recording the resulting stationary process, provides us 
with sufficient phenomenology to identify similar processes in the real business world. 
2.11  Modern markets for information tend to be dominated by "gatekeepers" (portals in our case) 
who charge fees from services and their consumers who transmit and acquire information. For 
traditional gatekeepers, such as newspapers and magazines, these fees are simply advertising 
and customer subscription fees (Bhargava and Feng 2001, Bhargava and Feng 2002). In case 
of Internet, in most scenarios, there is no contribution from the consumer side at all. 
Advertisement models  
2.12  With regard to related models in the economic literature, it is worth mentioning (Baye and 
Morgan 2001) who deal with price-rankable products within an equilibrium model. Thier work 
addresses the economic impact of portals, where both consumers and service providers are 
being charged by portals. The portal fees come from services that advertise prices on their 
websites, and from consumers who access ratings (list of advertised prices). 
2.13  Portals' profits are maximized in an equilibrium, with the conditions where (a) the product 
market exhibits price dispersion, (b) access fees are sufficiently low so that all consumers 
subscribe; (c) advertising fees are partially affordable for services, and (d) advertised prices 
are below unadvertised prices. In addition, a large numbers of models have been used to assist 
in decision making in advertising. Econometric and other market models, as well as decision 
calculus models such as ADBUDG, have been used in the determination of advertising 
budgets (Little 1970). Media selection and scheduling models have included linear and 
nonlinear programming-type models, such as MEDIAC (Lodish 1966), and decision calculus 
models. Few models, such as ADMOD (Aaker 1977), have been designed to deal 
simultaneously with resources and media allocation decisions, where what we model in this 
study is a partial case of the latter. Our model can be considered as being complementary to 
the advertising model of Vidale and Wolfe (1957). It is an econometric model that represents 
the rate of change of sales as a function of the rate of advertising spending. The tagged effect 
of advertising is incorporated using a sales decay term. (The model allows the effect of 
advertising to have different increase versus decay rates).  
A formal model  
3.1  We use a matrix M to express ratings (initially pure and then forced), where M(s,p) denotes the 
rating of service s by portal p. Ratings of services are represented by integers from 1 to ns, 
where the ratings are presented in ascending order from the highest rated service (1) to the 
lowest one (ns). Each column of M contains integers 1,...,ns in a certain order such that each 
integer occurs only once, i.e. a portal cannot assign the same rating to two services. 
3.2  The average rating for a service, s, over the set of portals, is given by: 
 
(1) 
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where #p denotes the number of portals. Indeed, services intend to achieve better rating from 
portals with higher reputation, so the weighed M(s,p) comes into play (Section 4).  
3.3  The reputation for a portal is calculated as the reciprocal of the deviation of the rating it gives 
to each service from the average rating of the service, and is given by 
3.4  Portal reputations are greater than zero: the higher reput(p) the better the reputation is (i.e. the 
closer the totality of the given portal is to the average). If we assume that for a given portal its 
rating of every service is identical to the average rating, then the reputation of a portal 
approaches infinity. When selecting which portal to subscribe to, a service chooses the portal 
with the highest reputation while taking into account its possible increase in rating so that its 
rating will be as close to the highest rating (i.e. 1) as possible. More specifically, service, s, 
makes a subscription offer to portal, p, in such a way that 
is maximized.  
3.5  Out of the totality of services which make a subscription offer to a given portal, the portal 
selects the one which would decrease its reputation the least. More specifically, portal p 
chooses to accept the subscription from the service s that minimizes 
.  
3.6  When portal, p, accepts the subscription offer from service, s, then s transfers m resource units 
to p, and p increases the ranking of s by one. So, if s was ranked at position n and s' was 
ranked at position n-1, their rankings are swapped. In the special case when s was already 
ranked at position 1, the portal does not accept the offer from s. 
3.7  For example, the top scenario shown in Figure 1 is beneficial for a rating portal because after 
the rating for the subscribed service is increased, this services rating will get closer to the 
average rating over all portals, and therefore its reputation increases as a result of the 
transaction. Conversely, for the scenario shown on the bottom of Figure 1, the increase in 
rating desired by this service will cause the portal's reputation to decrease, since its rating of 
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3.8  The algorithmic steps of the simulation are depicted at Figure 2. Two modules where the 
selection strategies are implemented are highlighted. 
The simulation that produced the results described in the next section was implemented in 
Matlab and is available from the first author on request.  
Simulation runs  
Forming the simulation dataset  
4.1  We first present the dataset that we used to track the dynamics of the interaction between 
services and portals, capturing the behaviour patterns of the involved agents and judging their 
rationality. The purpose of this dataset is to verify the consistency of our model with respect to 
the rationality of the portal selection strategy of services and the offer acceptance strategy of 
 
Figure 1. Two scenarios showing how portals' ratings change 
 
Figure 2. The modules of the interaction process 
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portals. 
4.2  We formed the initial dataset of pure ratings from a selected set of fifteen mutual funds, rated 
by a set of four portals as a 4 by 15 matrix, where each column, representing a portal, contains 
numbers from 1 to 15 (without repetitions) denoting the ratings of the services by the portal. 
4.3  For our simulations, we select four keyword-search companies as portals (Google, Altavista, 
Lycos and Hotbot) and obtained the pure ratings of the fifteen mutual funds as services 
abbreviated as ici, brill, vanguard, ameristock, mfs, bmo, rbcfund, ariel, oakmark, janus, 
portfolio21, scotia, prudential, ci, calvert. Our choice of mutual funds as potential subscribers 
to rating services is because their ratings are very important for investment decisions. Also, it 
is very hard for a non-experienced investor to estimate a rating of mutual fund even having 
invested in it. 
4.4  To obtain the initial rating, we observed the order in which each of the above mutual funds 
appeared in the list of items delivered in response to query "mutual fund". Only the 
occurrences (sequence) of the above funds were extracted from the search query results in 
each of the above search engines. For model validation we have extracted the above search 
results during 6 consecutive months, starting from April 2004. The dataset for initial 
conditions was collected on 12 April 2004. 
4.5  To visualize the dynamics of the interactions, we plot the two following types of curves: 
1. Distributions of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals; and  
2. The evolution of these parameters over time.  
Simulating distributions of rating, reputation and resources  
4.6  The first type of curve is useful to illustrate how services and portals are different at a specific 
point in time, and the second type to illustrate the changes of ratings/reputations and resources 
for each agent over a period of time. 
4.7  In addition to the initial ratings, the following simulation parameters were used: 
1. Initial resources set at 1000 units.  
2. Subscription fee (per transaction) set at a flat rate of 50 units.  
Portals do not need initial resources in this model because they can only acquire them. At this 
point we assume that all services have the same initial resources; when they run out of 
resources they cannot subscribe for rating any more and become dormant. In our further 
simulations we will show the trends for randomized initial conditions. 
4.8  For the sake of uniformity of our simulation the services pay the same (50 units) for increasing 
their ratings. It is the same amount to change a rating from 13 to 12 as it is from 2 to 1; rating 
increases always start with the lowest number (which is the number of services being rated). 
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In Figure 3, on the charts for distributions of ratings/reputations shown in the upper half of the 
figure, diamonds denote the initial ratings and circles denote the final ones. On the charts for 
resources shown in the lower half of the figure, dots and circles denote the respective values 
for services (left) and for portals (right).  
4.9  We observe that about a half of services have run out of resources, all of which have been 
transferred over time to the portals (see the dots on the bottom of the resources of services 
chart). Remarkably, these services (except for #15) did not improve their ratings. 
4.10  Those services which dramatically improved their ratings still have some resources left, which 
they can use to further improve their rating on portals. We observe on the chart that only those 
services whose average rating is below 11 have actually improved their pure rating. 
4.11  Therefore, one may suppose that only the lowest rated services will have an interest in paying 
a subscription fee to the portals (assuming that a pure rating is possible). However, this is far 
from the truth: the other services need to keep trying to move the ratings in the direction which 
favours them, otherwise, their forced rating will significantly deteriorate relative to their initial 
pure rating. What our simulations show is that the group of services with an initial higher 
ratings run out of resources earlier than the group with an initial lower rating. This happens, 
since the first group has to compensate for the actions of the second group. 
Dynamics of subscription process  
 
Figure 3. Distributions of average (forced) ratings, reputations and resources. Both partially 
rational strategies of service subscription offers and portals acceptance are used. Arrows on 
the top charts show the overall change in average rating/reputation (from zero to 60th 
simulation step, to match with Figure 4) 
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Naturally, the sum of the average ratings of the services is constant irrespectively of individual 
ratings. However, this is not the case for portals, whose reputations get worse in the course of 
subscription process. 
It takes first 10 steps to establish an equilibrium of ratings between the services, and an 
equilibrium of reputations between the portals (see Figure 4). Once the equilibrium is 
achieved, an oscillation pattern appears, which is caused by pairs of financial services that 
have their ratings swapped between position i and position i-1. As a result, the reputations of 
the portals are interchanged in a similar way, leading to an oscillating pattern between portals 
as well. The amplitude of oscillations for services is a quarter of unit (one out of four changes 
to the reputations of portals contributes to this amplitude). On the other hand, for the portals 
we observe oscillations with amplitudes which are higher than a single unit.  
4.12  There is the critical point, at steps 38-45, when the interaction between the agents changes, at 
the time when eight of the services run out of resources. After that, the offers of the remaining 
services are always accepted, and the portal reputations are subject to further deterioration, as 
well as the ratings of these eight services that ran out of resources. However, the ratings of 
those services which have not run out of resources during these steps increase during steps 45-
60. After that time, there is a smaller number of services capable of paying a subscription fee; 
3 out of 4 of the portals are not offered a subscription and therefore do not increase their 
resources after this critical point. The competition for the subscription offers by services to be 
accepted by portals is still strong: all services wish to subscribe to the same portal, and the 
portal they all desire to subscribe to can only accept the subscription from a single service 
according to the rules of the game. 
4.13  We outline the five zones we have detected within the evolution charts of interacting services 
and portals: 
1. The equilibrium establishing zone;  
 
Figure 4. The evolution of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals over 
time. 
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2. The oscillation zone;  
3. The resources disappearance zone;  
4. The limited resources equilibrium establishing zone; and  
5. The stationary zone.  
As is visible in the evolution charts (Figure 3), in accordance to what we have revealed in the 
distribution charts (Figure 4), only the lowest-rated services benefit from the process (the 
bottom part of top-left chart in Figure 3). The evolution charts show that the rating of the 
lowest-rated services increases during both the second (oscillation) and the fourth (limited 
resources equilibrium establishing) zones. There is no service that would significantly benefit 
from the process, since no service has improved its average rating by more than 2 units. 
4.14  In introducing the model of the subscription process, the assumptions we are making are as 
general as possible. These assumptions were the result of observations regarding the sequence 
of characteristic zones in the evolution curves of ratings and resources of the involved agents. 
We therefore conjecture that an arbitrary subscription process that is connected with rating-
providing businesses would have a similar set of zones. Concerning the last zone, our 
conjecture is backed up by the assumption that this process eventually ends because the 
services would not want to spend any further resources. 
4.15  Since the rating, reputation and resources data for business agents is available, it is possible, in 
principle, to apply the respective feature extraction mechanism to identify the simulated 
process and its current zone. 
Introducing "independent" portals  
 
Figure 5. The evolution of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals over 
time, where one portal with a low initial reputation is independent (i.e. it does not accept 
service subscription) 
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4.16  When a given portal does not accept subscription fees, its rating in the evolution curve in an 
environment where other portals accepts subscription fees is quite similar to the situation 
above, where every portal accepts subscription fees (Figure 5). The resource curve for this 
portal is a horizontal line on the bottom of the chart; the three remaining resources curves go 
together until step 48 when two of the portals stop gaining any further resources. 
4.17  The resultant reputation of a portal is even lower when no subscription can be accepted, 
because the pure ratings it publishes will have a greater deviation from the average value. The 
latter is mostly affected by the portals that can accept subscriptions. The reputation dynamics 
closely follow the case when this portal can accept a subscription (see Figure 4). Therefore, 
the overall subscription process is only weakly affected by a minority of portals which cannot 
accept subscription. The reputation of an independent portal which does not accept 
subscription drops because this portal becomes "less than average", representing a true rating 
for services. Overall we observe the phenomenon that if the majority of portals accept 
subscriptions, their rating becomes "more average" and their reputation grows in comparison 
with an independent portal. 
A similar situation is depicted at Figure 5a. The portals with initially low reputation gain are 
the independent ones. This would not be the case if they accepted subscriptions.  
4.18  We observed that if a majority of portals select to accept subscription, the rest of portals which 
decide to stay independent would sacrifice their reputation (and, obviously, resources). At the 
 
Figure 5a. The evolution of ratings/reputations and resources of services and portals over 
time, where three portals out of eight with a low, medium and high initial reputation are 
independent 
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same time, if a minority of portals choose to accept subscriptions, they would gain revenue but 
loose their reputation In our simulation settings we do not obtain a quantitative estimate of the 
ratio between these two groups of portals. 
Introducing services unwilling to subscribe  
4.19  When only the lowest-rated sites choose to offer subscription fees to portals to increase their 
ratings, the process immediately converges to the fifth zone (stationary) without passing 
through the intermediate zones (see Figure 6). In this case portal reputations significantly drop, 
as well as the ratings of all the services which decided to avoid the subscription. The case 
when some service withdrew from the subscription process is quite different from that of 
portals: there is a dramatic change in the process for the former, whereas the latter case does 
not significantly change. The competition between the services is not strong enough to lead to 
an oscillation. 
Eliminating cycles from services subscription  
4.20  In this section we will simulate the behaviour of service agents with augmented rationality. In 
the course of the subscription process, the following kind of cycle is frequent: 
 
Figure 6. The evolution curves where only the four lowest-rated services subscribe 
At a current step, one service, #1, swaps its rank with another service, #2, being rated by a 
portal. 
At the next step, #2 selects this portal and swaps its rank with that of #1.  
At the next step, #1 selects the same portal and swaps rank with #2 again.  
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As a result, both services #1 and #2 quickly run out of resources without gaining much rating, 
because they directly compete only with each other. A more rational strategy for a service 
would be to avoid getting into a cycle by choosing the second best portal with respect to its 
reputation and obtain the rating of service #1 at this portal. Such increased rationality will be 
beneficial for #2 but not other services, and will not allow portals to have an "easy ride" with 
respect to collecting resources and not giving up reputations in the above cycle scenario.  
4.21  The curves at Figure 7 do not demonstrate the "oscillation" behaviour (compared with Figure 
4). The overall behaviour is more complex, and it is hard to distinguish zones because services 
continuously run out of resources. The simulation requires more steps since the resources are 
spent in a more rational way. 
Services and portals with random strategy  
At the next step, #2 ...  
 
Figure 7. The evolution charts where services avoid cycles (longer run, 150 steps) 
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4.22  In this section we simulate a less rational behaviour of portals and services, where the services 
are ignorant about their rating and/or portals are ignorant about their reputation. To 
parameterise the ratings of services, taking into account how they are rated by portals with 
higher and lower reputations, we use the weighted rating calculated as 
As we presented in the "Economic model" section above, a rational strategy for a service is to 
maximize the above expression and also subscribe for portals which gives it higher ratings. 
Moreover, as we mentioned in the previous section, avoiding cycles usually helps to decrease 
inefficient spending of resources competing with the same service. Hence random strategy 
prevents services from achieving the above.  
4.23  As to the portals, random selection of subscription offers (which does not target minimizing a 
drop in reputation) leads to situations where portals get less resources for the same drop of 
reputation (compare with Figures 4 and 5 a above). In case of irrational behaviour reputations 
drop monotonously to lower values than under the partially rational behaviour we build for 
portals in this study. Under both random and rational behaviour the reputation of each portal 
approaches its asymptotic value. All such values are below the initial reputation of the lowest 
portal for the former. 
4.24  When portals are irrational, there is no strong deviation in services' behaviour from the case 
when portals are rational, except that the services lose resources at a slower pace. In real life, 
 
Figure 8. Evolution charts where portals accept subscription randomly 
 
(5) 
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the degree of rationality may vary but we believe that the suggested strategy for services and 
portals is simple, plausible and brings in a dramatic improvement in results of the subscription 
process. 
4.25  When services are irrational, they choose arbitrary portals to subscribe to. As a result the 
irrational services spend more resources for the same gain in rating or the same support of 
their rating level than rational services. 
4.26  There are also a number of common features regarding the behaviour of services and portals 
which do not change under a random subscription strategy. 
Varying initial conditions  
4.27  We have verified that similar behaviour of services and portals occurs under a wide spectrum 
of initial conditions, having their strategies fixed. Moreover, under both partially rational and 
irrational strategies the process of averaging of ratings takes place (compare Figure 6,7,8). 
Ratings of services tend to converge. 
4.28  Under a higher number of services (30) and portals (16) we also observe similar behaviour 
(Figure 9). Moreover, an increase in the number of services and portals does not lead to a 
noticeable change in agents' behaviour, except that the rating curves are smoother and 
reputation curves are more volatile than when the number of agents is lower. 
4.29  Varying the subscription cost between services and between portals, and deviating initial 
 
Figure 9. The simulation run with 16 portals and 30 services showing the behaviour similar 
to the one produced by a smaller number of agents 
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distribution of resources from uniform does not result in additional behavioural observations, 
and therefore the results support the stability of simulation model with respect to above 
parameters. Also, the extreme cases with all agents having equal initial ratings, and totally 
independent initial ratings by different portals have been verified not to deviate from the 
common pattern. Moreover, in cases of symmetric or asymmetric initial distributions of ratings 
and resources, the ratings converge and resources decrease at the same speed, but the delays of 
the decrease in resources is indeed dependent on the respective symmetry or asymmetry.  
Results  
5.1  In this study we have simulated the process of the interaction between the services which 
desire a higher rating on portals, whose revenue model is based on a subscription fee where 
the flow of resources is from services to portals. We called this process the "subscription 
process". 
5.2  We enumerate the common features of the behaviour of services and portals demonstrated 
under a wide variety of simulation settings, including their strategies and initial conditions: 
? Participating in the subscription process, initially highly rated services run out of 
resources and their ratings drop, while low rated services both increase their rank and 
keep their resources. Overall ratings of services converge to a narrower range than 
initial.  
? When each agent participates in the subscription process, the reputation of independent 
portals, which do not accept subscriptions, drops. Also, the ratings of the highly-rated 
services, which choose not to subscribe to portals in order to compensate for 
subscriptions of other services, drop in the course of the process.  
? When just a small portion of lowest-rated services offer subscriptions to portals, it 
nevertheless strongly decreases the reputation of portals accepting these subscriptions 
and the ratings of other services.  
Therefore, it seems that when a low proportion of interacting agents participate in the 
subscription process, it has a negative effect on the ratings of others, and thereby encourages 
these other services to compensate for their lost rating by joining the process. At the same 
time, it is quite unprofitable with respect to both ratings and resources to stop subscribing to 
portals. For services, it would be profitable to stop subscribing synchronously, knowing that 
other services would cooperate and also stop subscribing. This is, however, impossible 
because the services do not have knowledge about each other in terms of participation in the 
subscription process. 
5.3  We observe that both for services and portals, it is not a "winner takes all" situation: services 
which were initially rated as "best", drop their rating in the process of subscription. If the best 
rated services do not participate in subscription, their ratings fall even further. Therefore, 
special initiatives or proper timing of participation does not play a major role in the 
subscription process. Our prediction based on the current model is that eventually all or a 
majority of players in a market sector would have to join the subscription process, but one 
cannot expect major winners or losers. Instead, the subscription process is the machinery 
which brings the participants into an equilibrium state, providing a revenue stream for portals. 
5.4  The paper suggests that portals should be following other portals very closely to observe and 
forecast their advertisement policy. Failing to do so would lead to loss of reputation even if a 
given portal tries to rate services as objectively as possible.  
Discussion and Related Work  
6.1  We have presented the process of competitive services officially subscribing to a rating 
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mechanism on portals. In reality, this process may not have such a formal arrangement and 
occur in way where different participating agents lack information about the subscription 
arrangements of others. We have obtained the sequence of zones in our simulation process: 
transition from the initial zone to the final zone is expected to be associated with some 
legalisation process, when explicit rules of subscription offer/acceptance are formed and every 
agent becomes knowledgeable of these rules. The services subscription model should become 
transparent to the customers, and we suppose that some legislation will control the practice of 
this process and enforce the disclosure of its details. Currently, the Federal Trade Commission 
in the USA recommends search engines having paid-placement advertising results to clearly 
separate these from results obtained from the search engine ranking algorithm (Federal Trade 
Commission 2004). 
6.2  We expect the portals will find ways to legalize the practice of subscription. Since the 
technology and business development moves ahead of the respective legislation, we believe 
portals will try to be appealing to both services (advertisers) and end users. In a more realistic 
model, we assume that portals will have a more accurate way to reflect the true rating. 
Economic issues  
6.3  We also think that the applicability of the above simulations goes beyond the online media. 
When the practice of subscription to the online rating services becomes generally accepted 
without clear alternatives, TV and paper media may wish to follow it. 
6.4  Acceptability of the concept of monetary value associated with rating is not as striking as may 
seem to the reader initially. Consulting various media, the majority of people have got used to 
the idea that all the information is biased and therefore needs some re-digestion to be 
trustworthy. We believe that a rating portal, which prefers to stay independent, would not 
impress the audience as being so because the ratings of such a portal may significantly deviate 
from those of other portals involved in the subscription process. 
6.5  The other possibility that needs to be mentioned is that the subscription process may become 
illegal or highly discouraged. In this case the process of subscription laid out in this study may 
be perceived by the reader as a process of corruption. Since our simulations suggest the 
criteria to extract the behavioural patterns from the rating data that is publicly available, in this 
case, we may be able to reveal corruption that is specific to rating portals. 
6.6  Nowadays, after Google's IPO, the business model of paid placement and sponsored 
advertising has become very popular, and the majority of search engines have designated areas 
for displaying advertisement slots on their search results web pages. The number of 
advertisement placements is expected to grow even faster, and their order (from top to bottom) 
may be interpreted by users as a rating by a respective search portal. This is due to the fact that 
it is hard for end users to access the pricing policy for paid placements at keyword search 
portals (Sherman 2004). 
6.7  Relevant data available for our analysis is the evolution of ratings of services from a particular 
sector (finance), obtained as an ordered list of links to services' websites. Sponsored links 
could be a better data source here, but as of the end of 2004 there is no sufficiently extensive 
dataset available for our analysis. We collected the ratings of 15 services from 4 portals 
mentioned in the introduction in May 2004 and then twice in July and November. The data 
collected in May is used as initial conditions of our simulation, and two consecutive ratings are 
used to match the phenomena of rating convergence. Although a systematic pattern in the 
evolution of ratings cannot be extracted from such limited dataset, there is an explicit 
reduction of the range of ratings for the selected mutual funds. We can at least state that this 
observation does not defeat our simulations results. Further analysis of the evolution of the 
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rating of paid placements is required to reveal the role of the subscription process. 
6.8  In this study we assumed that it is hard for the users of the services to estimate the pure rating. 
In particular, it is the case for the selected dataset of the mutual funds. As a further study we 
plan to bring the user agent in the loop, taking into account the deviation of the portals' rating 
from the pure rating; reputation of portals will then be redefined accordingly. The subscription 
resources of services will then be added proportionally to the overall rating perceived by users. 
It may happen in these settings that the winner-takes-all situation occurs. We also plan to build 
a multi-agent web infrastructure for automated agents for portals, services and users. 
6.9  This work follows along the lines of the study of an economy of web links, where the potential 
monetary values of web links has been explored, and a link exchange process has been 
simulated (Galitsky and Levene 2004). Clearly, assuming that the majority of links are 
established as a result of such an exchange is unrealistic, however, it sheds some light on how 
web links might be established in a future economy should the process of link exchange 
become prevalent. Analogously, in the current study, we overstate the role of the interaction 
between a service and a rating portal in order to judge how the former may affect the latter in 
the course of a competition for a better rating. 
6.10  The results of our simulation study can be considered as creation of a novel advertising model 
that is suitable for online portals. Subscription process is a way of increasing demand by 
bringing the product to the attention of consumers. Advertising can be either informative or 
persuasive. The effectiveness of advertising can be measured by the elasticity of demand, 
which measures the percentage increase in demand divided by the percentage increase in 
advertising spending. In terms of advertisement, rating can be considered as a persuasive 
advertising means (compare with Section 2).  
Conclusions  
7.1  In this study we suggested a possible process of how the natural intentions of services to spend 
their resources to gain a better rating may be formulated, and the formulation of the intentions 
of portals to, possibly, sacrifice their reputation in order to gain resources from services, may 
compliment each other. We observed that the collective intentions of the above agents 
(Galitsky 2002) find a matching strategy, not necessarily compatible with the individual 
intentions of participating agents, some of which may deviate from the majority of agents. In 
particular, initially highly rated services do not intend to enlist to the subscription process, but 
they have to accept the rules of the game once the other services have enrolled. 
7.2  Since it is possible to observe real-world rating data and its evolution, one can extract the 
patterns of the subscription process, including the stationary zones and the transition zones. 
Such behaviour as oscillations in ratings , for example, will indicate that there is a strong 
competition between services for a particular portal. Such patterns can be revealed , for 
example, by analysing search engine ranking resulting from keyword queries. 
7.3  Returning to the real-life problems, we cannot reject the possibility that the rating portals 
would form their business model in accordance to what we suggest in this paper. The question 
remains, if not the suggested business model, what else should the rating portals do nowadays 
to have a stable revenue stream?  
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